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ABSTRACT 
This study aimed to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
effectiveness and financial reporting quality among family and non-family 
owned companies in the Sultanate of Oman. This study used a panel dataset 
for 68 companies listed on the Muscat Securities Market for 6 years from 2013 
to 2018. The study contributes to the literature by extending previous financial 
reporting quality with a consideration of the Sultanate of Oman business 
environment where family ownership control is more common. Additionally, 
this study contributes by using a composite measure of corporate governance 
mechanisms to capture the combined effect of corporate governance 
effectiveness on the propensity of financial reporting quality, based on the 
agency's theoretical framework. This study is based on the difference between 
family and non-family owned firms with Type I and Type II agency problems, 
with differences in ownership and control. This study contributes to the 
literature by examining the influences of corporate governance effectiveness 
on financial reporting quality, which is expected to be different between 
family and non-family firms. The empirical results indicate that the association 
between corporate governance effectiveness and its financial reporting quality 
is positive and significant for both, the full sample as well as the non-family 
firms. However, this relationship appears to be weaker for family owned 
firms. 
Keywords: corporate governance effectiveness, financial reporting quality, 
family and non-family firms, Oman. 
ARTICLE INFO 
Article History: 
Received: 18 July 2019 
Accepted: 6 November 2019 
Published: 31 December 2019 
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 14 Issue 3 
124 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Family businesses are often an overlooked form of business ownership in both 
developed and developing countries, yet they constitute the majority of the 
businesses. The differences between these countries in managing family firms 
have been discussed by several studies; for example, La Porta, Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) by using 27 countries from around the world found that family 
firms are the most common type of economic organization in these countries. 
In a study by Barontini and Caprio (2006) using 675 firms listed in 11 
European countries found that the firms controlled by families account for 53 
per cent of the sampled companies. Anderson and Reeb (2003) in a study of 
403 companies among the S&P 500 industries in the United States (US) 
determined that more than one-third of these companies are family firms. 
Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000) of 2,980 listed companies in nine 
countries in East Asia, claimed that companies controlled by families account 
for 66 per cent of the companies studied. Besides, of 304 listed companies in 
four Arab countries, Omran, Bolbol and Fatheldin (2008) found that the firms 
controlled by families account for 68 per cent of the sampled companies.  
 
Although many family-owned firms have a considerable presence in 
the publicly traded corporations, family-owned firms are different from non-
family firms. According to the agency theory, family owners expend more 
effort to monitor managers than other types of large shareholders. This 
suggests that, compared to non-family companies, the Type I agency problem 
(manager-owner) may be less prevalent in family firms due to a less 
information asymmetry existing among manager-owners (Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb, 2004). However, the Type II agency problem is perceived to be more 
severe in family firms because family owners may have both the incentive and 
the ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, 
which is harmful to firm value (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2006). 
 
Also, ownership and control in family firms are not separated. In other 
words, family-owned firms have both a larger share of equity and executives 
in their companies.  In non-family firms, ownership is dispersed among small 
shareholders and the monitoring role is concentrated among professional 
managers. Consequently, these differences have led to different styles of 
management, levels of motivation among the founders, family values and 
decision-making processes (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Chua, Chrisman & 
Chang, 2003). Therefore, based on the differences between family and non-
family owned firms with Type I and Type II agency problems, and the 
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difference in ownership and control; the influence of corporate governance 
effectiveness on financial reporting quality is expected to be different for 
family and non-family firms. 
 
Corporate governance is one of the main elements that determines the 
condition of a firm's system and its ability to survive economic shocks. 
Consequently, good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic 
development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their 
access to outside capital (Sarbah & Xiao, 2015). Although various 
management issues in family firms have been analysed, there are still aspects 
left for research. Important issues that remain include the relationship between 
family control and corporate governance structures and the influence of 
generation on these governance mechanisms (Duller, 2012). Further, having 
high-quality corporate governance increases the company's value because it 
can signal a good indicator to investors and shareholders regarding the quality 
of its financial reporting and overall internal control system. This attention to 
corporate governance quality can be explained by the fact that there are 
financial and nonfinancial costs attached to corporate governance quality, such 
as the reputation of its auditor and director, the director's success, stock price 
and company values.  
 
Recent studies have used the aggregate measurement for corporate 
governance quality in investigating the impact of corporate governance 
performance and the quality of its financial reporting. Most of these studies 
provide interesting evidence viewing that aggregate measurement of corporate 
governance quality has many desirable effects, such as high performance, high 
financial reporting quality and high audit quality. For example, Brown and 
Caylor (2006), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Larcker, Richardson 
and Tuna (2007) stated a positive relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and the firm's performance. Besides, DeFond, Hann and Xuesong 
(2005) reported that aggregate measure of corporate governance quality 
positively affects market reaction, accounting conservatism (Lara, Osma & 
Penalva, 2007; Krishnan & Visvanathan 2008) and earnings quality (Kent, 
Routledge & Stewart, 2010; Baber, Liang & Zhu, 2012). Similarly, Zaman, 
Hudaib and Haniffa (2011), Sharma, Sharma and Ananthanarayanan (2011) 
and Cassell, Giroux and Omer (2012) find a positive association between the 
quality of corporate governance, audit quality and disclose that weaker quality 
of corporate governance is more likely to have lower audit quality. 
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The current study contributes to the literature by extending the scope 
of previous work regarding financial reporting quality by considering the 
business environment in the Sultanate of Oman where family ownership and 
control are more common. Furthermore, the current study contributes by 
considering the effect of corporate governance mechanisms as an aggregate 
measure to capture the combined effect of these mechanisms on the propensity 
of the financial reporting quality based on a framework conceptualized 
according to the agency theory. Finally, based on the difference between 
family and non-family owned firms with Type I and Type II agency problems, 
and the differences in ownership and control, this study further contributes to 
the literature by examining the influence of corporate governance 
effectiveness on financial reporting quality, which is expected to be different 
between family and non-family firms. 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Corporate Governance for Family and Non-Family Firms  
 
The importance of good corporate governance to improve the 
competitiveness of the capital market sector and attract foreign investors into 
the local market has been increasingly recognised by the Omani government 
(Al-Busaidi, 2008), thus achieving better corporate performance and 
enhancing a better relationship with all stakeholders (Shankaraiah & Rao, 
2004). According to the corporate governance perspective, companies that 
adopt high-quality corporate governance practices are better-governed. 
Beekes and Brown (2006) argue that corporate governance quality affects the 
financial reporting disclosure and that increasing the quality of corporate 
governance is associated with more timely disclosure. Recent corporate 
governance literature posits that corporate governance quality is not reflected 
by a single mechanism of corporate governance because corporate 
governance mechanisms are interdependent or substitute each other (Larcker 
et al., 2007; Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven, 2011; Baber et al., 2012). 
Therefore, considering a broader measure of corporate governance that 
includes internal and external mechanisms is more appropriate for measuring 
the quality of corporate governance.  
 
Consistent with this, prior literature established that corporate 
governance quality leads to accounting conservatism (Krishnan & 
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Visvanathan, 2008), enhances discretionary accruals quality (Kent et al., 
2010) and increases audit quality (Sharma et al., 2011; Cassell et al., 2012). 
In addition, higher corporate governance quality in companies enhances the 
quality of their financial reporting, transparency and disclosure of accounting 
information (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond, 2006; Sengupta, 1998; 
Aldamen & Duncan, 2012). Therefore, the role of the board of directors and 
audit committee, as the main internal mechanism of corporate governance, is 
important to provide key monitoring of these agency costs. 
 
Lefort and Urzua (2008) indicate that the board of directors is an 
essential internal governance mechanism that provides the main control over 
agency costs, and deals with the problems relating to the management of the 
organization. Specifically, board quality leads to the validity of accounting 
statements, which causes banks to have greater faith in internal governance 
mechanisms, thus reducing borrowing costs. In addition, companies with 
high board quality reduction in the default risk due to the reduced agency 
problems and improved monitoring of managerial actions, are likely to 
provide credible financial reports (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et 
al., 2004; Piot, Missonier & Piera, 2007; Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008). 
 
However, the role, structure, and composition of the board of 
directors differ between family firms and non-family firms. Generally, these 
structures are determined by the business size, complexity, and maturity of 
the owning family (IFC Corporate Governance). In the early years of their 
existence, the majority of family businesses created a board of directors to 
comply with legal requirements. These were known as "paper boards" whose 
purpose was primarily limited to approving the financial business, dividends 
and other procedures that the law required via the board of directors 
(Kosnick, 1987).  
 
Some studies have found that family firms have a slightly smaller 
board of directors and fewer independent directors than non-family firms 
(Chen & Cheng, 2008). In family firms, it is a norm to see the same people 
serving as the manager and on the board of directors, as well as becoming 
owners of the company. Such a governance structure adds little value to the 
family business, which can lead to conflict and inefficiency in the company, 
particularly regarding the oversight of strategic decisions (IFC Corporate 
Governance). 
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Prior research on financial reporting quality has empirically linked 
with board characteristics in an individual investigation. For instance, 
Rahman and Ali (2006) showed that the role of independent directors in 
increasing the quality of earning management is insignificant. Kent et al. 
(2010) reported that board independence does not constrain earrings 
management as proxies by discretionary accruals quality. Dhaliwal, Naiker 
and Navissi (2010) found that independent directors who do not sit on the 
audit committee are insignificantly associated with accruals quality. 
Nonetheless, board size is reported to influence company performance and 
financial reporting quality. Yermack (1996) examined the association 
between board size and company performance for large US publicly- traded 
companies and found that board size is negatively associated with Tobin's Q, 
a performance proxy. Beasley (1996) reported a positive relation between 
board size and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Vafeas (1999) 
suggests that holding a higher number of board meetings is an alternative 
value-relevant attribute of the corporate board. Board meeting provides the 
directors with a vein to discuss and approve decisions relating to strategic 
and monitoring duties. There is considerable research linking board meetings 
with company performance and financial reporting quality. For example, 
Vafeas (1999) reported that initially board meetings are negatively related to 
performance, but after years of increased board meetings, the company's 
performance improves, which suggests that more meetings enhance 
company's performance. Zaman et al. (2011) reported that holding more 
meetings is associated with high audit quality.  
 
Carcello, Hermanson and Riley (2002) claimed that more expert 
directors on the board, in terms of having a higher number of directorships, 
demand high-quality auditors because they have more loss in fraud or 
opportunistic cases and hiring such auditors may be associated with less 
opportunistic cases. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that directors with 
multiple board appointments can signal director expertise in control 
decisions. Schnake and Williams (2008) revealed that directors with multiple 
directorships are more likely associated with misconduct and this association 
is moderated by board size. More recent literature also provided inconsistent 
results with regard to whether multiple directorships enhances or destroy the 
quality of financial reporting (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Sharma & Kuang 2014). 
 
The audit committee is an important element of corporate governance 
and is concerned with establishing and monitoring the accounting processes 
to provide relevant and credible information to the firm's stakeholders 
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(Pincus, Rusbarsky & Wong, 1989; Beasley, 1996). Anderson et al. (2004) 
argue that the quality of audit committees is to ensure the soundness and 
quality of internal accounting and control practices. However, the 
effectiveness of the audit committee can be jeopardized by the presence of 
too many family members (Bettinelli, 2010). The agency theory predicts that 
family firms will have less demand for an effective audit committee because 
controlling families want to take advantage of minority shareholders. 
Focusing on a sample of 523 Hong Kong firms for the period of 1999-2000, 
Jaggi and Leung (2007) found that audit committees play a significant role in 
constraining earnings management even when ownership is concentrated in 
the hands of fewer people. However, they also found that the effectiveness of 
audit committees is significantly reduced when family members are present 
on corporate boards, particularly when family members dominate these 
boards. In addition, Wong (2011), based on 385 Hong Kong listed firms, 
confirms that family firms are associated with less audit committee 
independence and financial expertise. 
 
Some studies have examined the effect of audit committee 
characterises on financial reporting quality; for example, Raghunandan, Read 
and Rama (2001) showed that audit committee independence was associated 
with a stronger internal audit function. Klein (2002) revealed a negative 
association between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. 
Consistent with the later result, Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) 
indicated that audit committee independence constrains aggressive earning 
management. Recent evidence also holds the proposition of effective role 
provided by independent directors on the audit committee over the quality of 
financial reporting (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 
2010; Krishnan, Yuan & Wanli, 2011). There have been studies looking at 
the role and importance of audit committee size on a variety of outcomes. 
For example, Lin, Li and Yang (2006) contended and reported that the audit 
committee size is significantly associated with high-quality earnings. Persons 
(2009) found that companies with large audit committees have earlier 
voluntary disclosure and is less likely to commit fraudulent financial 
reporting. Ghosh, Marra and Moon (2010) found audit committee size 
positively associated with earning management.  
 
It has been posited that an active audit committee is expected to 
provide effective monitoring, and thus the reliability of financial reporting is 
enhanced (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & Reed, 2002). Several 
studies have been conducted to examine the impact of audit committee 
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meetings on financial reporting output and audit process. The findings of this 
literature suggest that more audit committee meetings is associated with 
fewer financial reporting problems and with higher audit quality (DeZoort et 
al. 2002). For example, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) found that 
companies with financial reporting problems held fewer audit committee 
meetings. Using earnings management proxies, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 
(2003) and Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) reported that there was a 
negative relationship between audit committee meetings and earnings 
management. However, Lin et al. (2006) and Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) reported an insignificant association between audit committee 
meetings, accounting restatements occurrence and accounting conservatism 
respectively. The audit committee is mainly responsible to oversee the 
financial reporting process, auditing and internal control processes; therefore, 
having financial experts constitute an imperative condition to ensure that the 
audit committee effectively performs its tasks. Xie et al. (2003) and Saleh et 
al. (2007) reported that companies with financial experts on audit committees 
were less likely to practice earning management. There is a considerable 
number of research conducted and have reported that only accounting 
expertise audit committee associated with accounting conservatism 
(Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008), internal control quality (Zhang et al., 2007; 
Goh, 2009), less occurrence of assets misappropriation (Mustafa & Youssef, 
2010), and high quality earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan et al., 
2011). 
 
Prior literature argues on the importance of an external auditor in 
adding credibility to financial reporting and in reducing the agency problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). However, these 
responsibilities need high-quality auditors to be effectively discharged 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Audit firms are usually grouped based on size, whether a 
firm is one of the recognized top tier audit firms (Kent et al., 2010). Big 
audit firms, Big-4, are recognized as the top tier audit firms and they can 
provide a higher quality audits than smaller audit firms (Francis, 2004). 
Lawrence et al. (2011) posit that the size of Big-4 audit firms assists them to 
supply high audit quality because this size can support more standardized 
audit methodologies, robust training programs, and more choices for suitable 
second partner reviews. Further, Kent et al. (2010) note that Big-4 audit 
firms have more financial accounting expertise and knowledgeable 
accounting standards staff that assist them to detect and predict irregular 
accounting practices. There are large numbers of empirical researches 
emerging to examine the audit quality of Big-N audit firms. The evidence 
largely confirms a higher audit quality of Big-N audit firms (Francis, 2004). 
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For instance Francis and Wilson (1988) found that Big-N audit firms are 
chosen by companies with high agency costs because management and 
shareholders believe the ability of such auditors to reduce agency costs. 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) show that Big-N auditors have lower thresholds 
for issuing modified audit reports, which indicates greater reporting 
conservatism. Francis (2004) reviewed audit quality literature and reported 
that Big-N audit firms are associated with the high-quality audit report and 
financial statements. 
 
The relevant literature reviewed above shows contrasting findings of 
the individual characteristics of the board of directors, audit committee and 
audit quality with financial reporting quality. This approach has been 
criticized in recent literature for its inability to represent the quality of the 
board of directors or the audit committee. Larcker et al. (2007) argue that 
mixed evidence of corporate governance effect on company performance or 
financial reporting quality can be attributed to using individual mechanisms. 
Further, Brown et al. (2011) note that using a single corporate governance 
mechanism is not appropriate to measure overall corporate governance 
quality and that research should use a composite corporate governance 
measure to provide a better measurement for corporate governance quality. 
Subsequently, it is reported that the relevancy of individual machines in the 
corporate governance system is tailored to other mechanisms (Baber et al., 
2012). Past studies by O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2008), Hoitash, 
Hoitash and Bedard (2009), Goh (2009), Ishak and Al-Ebel (2011), Fallatah 
and Dickins (2012), Lary and Taylor (2012), Aldamen and Duncan (2012), 
and Ramly (2013) combined a number of characteristics as a proxy for 
governance factors to produce a combined score for corporate governance. 
Applying the same reasoning, this study examined the board of directors, 
audit committee and external audit characteristics (independence, size, 
frequency meetings, expertise, directorship and audit reputation), as a 
composite measure for corporate governance effectiveness, to capture their 
combined effect on determining whether or not they are associated with the 
financial reporting quality for companies listed on the Muscat Securities 
Market. 
 
In addition, the contrasting findings above ignore the influence of the 
institutional structure of companies and countries, such as the ownership 
structure. According to Desender (2009), the effectiveness of the board of 
directors and audit committee depends on the institutional structure of 
companies and countries, such as ownership structure. For example, Bhojraj 
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and Sengupta (2003), and Kosnick (1987) show that companies with 
concentrated family ownership could not obtain the optimum quality reports 
even with an effective board of directors, because the board of directors is 
appointed to comply with legal requirements only. Several studies have 
shown a difference in firm performance between family and non-family 
firms (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Miller, 
Breton-Miller & Lester, 2007; Chahine, 2007; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 
2011; Ong & Gan, 2013). However, the empirical results for the performance 
between family and non-family owned firms are mixed. For example, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that family 
firms perform better than non-family firms, while Miller et al. (2007) 
indicate that firms that are owned and controlled by families or employ 
relatives as managers never exhibit superior performance. A study by 
Chahine (2007) on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries finds that 
private investor ownership business and personal relationships dominate the 
financial preferences, and, therefore, have a negative effect on bank value. 
Therefore, it is important to study family-owned firms because, compared to 
non-family owned firms, they are common among public firms in both 
developed and developing countries.  
 
This study attempted to extend these prior studies by examining 
whether there is any difference in the association between corporate 
governance effectiveness and financial reporting quality between family and 
non-family owned companies in the Sultanate of Oman where family-based 
ownership control is widespread and the legal protection of minority 
shareholders is weak (Omran et al., 2008). Within this weak regulatory 
framework, the controlling family can expropriate minority shareholders by 
appointing closely related directors. This practice might reduce the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms that influence the quality 
of financial reporting. Based on the above arguments and previous studies, 
this study expects that the influence of corporate governance effectiveness on 
the quality of financial reporting is weaker in family firms than in non-family 
firms. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Sources and Sample Selection Criteria 
 
The population of this study consisted of financial and non-financial 
firms that were listed on the Muscat Securities Market from 2013 to 2018. 
The total number of companies listed on the Muscat Securities Market was 
116 at the end of 2018. Due to the differences in the regulatory requirements, 
and the characteristics of their financial reports, which are different from 
those of non-financial firms, 31 banks and other financial institutions were 
excluded from the population (Lorca, Ballesta & Meca, 2011; Byun, 2007; 
Kim, Simunic, Stein & Yi, 2009). In addition, due to unavailable online 
financial reporting for some companies, 17 companies with missing data 
were excluded from the sample population. The final sample of this study for 
a single year is 68 firms. More specifically, this study used a balanced panel 
dataset, which has multiple observations of the same economic units. Each 
element has two subscripts, the group identifier, i (in this case 68 
companies), and within the group index denoted by t, which identifies time 
(in this case 2013-2018). Based on the balance panel dataset approach, each 
year from 2013-2018 has a sample size of 68 firms. The total number of 
observations for the entire period was 408 (68 firms for 6 years). 
 
Empirical Model 
 
This study used a panel dataset, which has multiple observations on 
the same economic units. Each element has two subscripts, the group 
identifier, i (in this case 68 companies) and within the group index denoted 
by t, which identifies time (in this case 2013-2018).  Based on the above 
sample this study started by reporting the descriptive statistics for the full 
sample of 408 firms, the family sample of 240 firms and the non-family 
sample of 168 firms. Subsequently, a descriptive analysis provided more 
descriptive information that enabled the data to be understood and 
interpreted more appropriately. Using the means from randomly drawn 
samples, the independent two-sample t-test was used to test whether the 
population means were significantly different between the family and non-
family firms. Additionally, this study used the following regression for the 
financial reporting quality: 
FRQit = a0 + β1CGEFFit + β2FSit + β3LEVit + β4ROAit + εit                                                             
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where: i represents company, t time period, FRQ is financial reporting 
quality, CGEFF is corporate governance effectiveness, FS is firm size, LEV 
is leverage, ROA is return on assets, and ε is the error term. 
 
Panel Data Estimation 
 
The financial reporting quality model in the previous equation is first 
estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS), which treats all the 
observations for all the periods as a single sample. The OLS model 
ignores the panel nature of data and assumes that εit has no serial 
correlation. However, panel data may have group effects, time effects, or 
even both. These effects are either fixed or random. A fixed-effects model 
assumes differences in intercepts across groups or periods, whereas a 
random-effects model explores differences in error variances. For a given 
observation, an intercept varying over units results in the structure:  
FRQit = a0 + β1CGEFFit + β2FSit + β3LEVit + β4ROAit + (ui + εit) 
 
where: ui is the individual-level effect, and εit is the disturbance term. The 
ui is either correlated or uncorrelated with predictor variables. The ui is 
always assumed to be uncorrelated with εit. If the ui is uncorrelated with the 
predictor variables, it is known as the random-effects model, but if the ui is 
correlated with the predictor variables, it is known as the fixed-effects 
model. The Hausman test is used to differentiate between the fixed effects 
model and the random-effects model. This test uses the difference between 
the two estimated covariance matrices (which is not guaranteed to be 
positively definite) to weigh the difference between the fixed effects model 
and the random-effects model vectors of slope coefficients. In contrast, the 
Breusch-Pagan (LM) test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) uses the OLS model as 
the null hypothesis, and the random-effects model as the alternative. 
 
Measurement of the Variables 
 
The dependent variable of this study was financial reporting quality; 
this study used accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
The measure employs a Dechow and Dichev's (2002) accrual quality model 
by Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005), which has recently been 
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considered as a better proxy for financial reporting quality (Aboody, 
Hughes & Liu, 2005; Biddle, Hilary & Verdi, 2009; Spiceland, Yang & 
Zhang, 2015; Yoo, Lim, & Chang, 2013). This measure is based on the 
observation that accruals map into cash flow realizations and regardless of 
managerial intent, the accrual quality is affected by the measurement error 
in accruals. In Dechow and Dichev's (2002) approach, the estimated 
residuals from firm-specific regressions of working capital accruals on past, 
present, and future cash flow from operations capture total accruals 
estimation error by management and are viewed as an inverse measure of 
earnings quality. Francis et al. (2005) extended the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) original accrual quality model by adding two additional variables, 
i.e. change in revenue and property, plant and equipment (PPE) for more 
complete characterization of the relation between accruals and cash flow. 
The following equation of accruals quality adopted as a proxy of financial 
reporting quality: 
 
For each firm-year, the equation is estimated cross-sectionally for all 
firms (minimum 10 firms within each industry groups In the Sultanate of 
Oman, there are two industry groups - Industrial and Services.) using 
rolling 6-year windows. Accrual quality equal to the standard deviation of 
firm іt estimated residuals. Larger standard deviations of residuals 
correspond to poorer accrual quality. Following DeFond et al. (2007) and 
Hashim & Devi (2008), the standard deviation score was multiplied by -1 
so that a higher score indicates higher earnings quality, therefore higher 
financial reporting quality. 
 
The definition of a family business is still subject to debate among 
researchers. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) define a family firm 
as either individuals or groups of founders or any close family relationship 
among the owners, directors or block holders.  On the other hand, Maury 
(2006) describes family ownership as the degree of family presence on the 
board in addition to acknowledge the exerting dimensions of family power. 
Furthermore, Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios (2002) define a family firm as 
consisting of three main dimensions – power, experience and culture of a 
family. However, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009), and McConaughy, 
Walker, Henderson and Mishra (1998) explain family-owned firms based 
on family control and voting rights.  From the above definitions, this study 
defined family firms in the Sultanate of Oman as private institutions that 
take the name of a family as well as individuals that have the same family 
name or any close form of family relationship among the owners.  
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Accordingly, family ownership in this study was measured as a percentage 
of shares owned by family shareholders who own 5% The 5% cut-off was 
used because the majority of the listed companies in the Sultanate of Oman 
only disclose the ownership of the major shareholders who own 5% or 
above of the firm's total equity or more of a firm in respect of the total 
number of shares issued (Chahine, 2007; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012). 
Therefore, to separate between family and non-family firms, this study used 
a dummy variable by assigning a value of one (1) for family firms if the 
major family shareholders own a stake of 5% or more of firm shares, and 
zero (0) otherwise for non-family firms. 
 
This study developed its measure of corporate governance 
effectiveness for the following reasons. First, existing corporate governance 
quality measures are not globally accepted or applicable, and they do not 
imply the optimal corporate governance quality measures (Khanchel, 2007). 
Second, Brown et al. (2011) indicate that a clear or an agreed theory to 
guide researchers in verifying elements of corporate governance quality 
measures is non-existent and researchers arbitrarily constructed their 
measures. Third, there is a strand of high-quality research which uses their 
measures of corporate governance quality (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012; 
DeFond et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 2007; Sharma et al., 2011) and these 
researches provide evidence that more effective corporate governance 
enhances company value and financial reporting quality.  
 
This study used nine characteristics of corporate governance to 
construct the measure of corporate governance effectiveness. Four board 
characteristics, four audit committee characteristics and one audit quality 
characteristic made up the composite measure of corporate governance 
effectiveness in this study. Following prior literature, corporate governance 
quality measure was built by the sum all these 9 characteristics of each 
company. However, these characteristics in most studies were either 
measured by continuous approach or by dichotomous approach. Therefore, 
to maintain the unity of the score, continuous variables were dichotomized 
based on a variable median or specific cut-off point. Based on this strategy, 
the highest score was 9 and the lowest, zero.  
 
Four characteristics of the board were used to measure effectiveness. 
1) board size, which is measured as the total number of directors available 
on the board (Anderson et al., 2004); a large size board can help the 
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company to reduce the state of dependence and uncertainty exterior, and 
provide a broader set of knowledge and managerial experience (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). 2) Independent directors measured as a proportion of the 
independent directors to total directors on the board (Lorca et al., 2011). 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) point out that an independent director contributes 
expertise and objectivity, which minimizes managerial entrenchment and 
expropriation of firm resources. 3) Board of director meetings, which is 
measured as the number of meetings held by the board during the year 
(Rahman & Ali, 2006). Garcia and Ballesta (2009) considered that the 
number of board meetings to be a good proxy for the directors' monitoring 
effort. 4) Directorships measured as the total seats held by directors divided 
by the total number of directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) argue that multiple directorships can adversely affect the 
ability of the directors to monitor the management as they are distracted by 
the affairs of other organizations. 
 
Four characteristics of the audit committee were used to measure 
effectiveness. 1) Audit committee size, which is measured as the number of 
directors on the audit committee (Goh, 2009). An audit committee of 
sufficient size can help the committee discharge its duties without 
overloading (Dezoort et al., 2002). 2) Independent directors on the 
committee, which is measured as the proportion of independent directors on 
the audit committee (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) state that the outside directors of an audit committee have an 
incentive to develop a reputation as experts in decision control, and, 
therefore, their existence on the board will enhance the internal control 
mechanism. 3) Audit committee meetings, which is measured as the number 
of meetings held by the audit committee per year (Raghunandan & Rama, 
2007). Menon and Williams (1994) consider frequent audit committee 
meetings as a signal for audit committee diligence. 4) Financial expertise 
for audit committee members, which is measured as the proportion of audit 
committee members with qualifications or experience in accounting or 
finances (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). DeZoort et al. (2002) argue that 
the knowledge of audit committee members in functional areas, such as 
auditing, accounting and finance, is regarded as a critical characteristic of 
audit committee effectiveness. 
 
With regard to audit quality characteristic to measure corporate 
governance, quality is audit firm size, Audit firm size is proxies by prior 
studies as Big-N and non-Big-N audit firms (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981; Balsam 
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 14 Issue 3 
138 
 
et al., 2003; Kent et al., 2010; Schmidt & Wilkins, 2013). This literature 
considers Big-8, 5 or 4 audit firms as high-quality audit providers because 
they have more skilled partners and staff and they have a strong reputation 
that motivates them to maintain high-quality audits. Fan and Wong (2005) 
consider Big-4 audit firms as the only effective external corporate 
governance mechanism in developing markets. However, the literature 
nowadays consider Deloitte & Touche, Ernst and Young, 
PricewaterhouseCooper and KPMG as big audit firms around the world. 
Therefore, this study usedthe dichotomy variable to measure audit firm size 
where a company is assigned 1 if it is audited by one of the Big-4 audit 
firms and zero otherwise. Audit firm size is used previously to build 
corporate governance quality measures (e.g. Khanchel, 2007; O'Sullivan et 
al., 2008).  
 
This study included control variables that have been shown to have 
a significant impact on financial reporting quality. This study included firm 
size as one of the main control variables measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Ghosh, 2005). Leverage was calculated as the percentage of 
total debt to total assets for the differences in the financial structure of firms 
and is used as a proxy for default risk (Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam, 
2010). This study included return on assets by dividing the net profit to total 
assets as an indicator of a firm's financial performance (Haniffa & Huduib, 
2006). 
 
Table 1: Operational Measurement of Variables 
Variables  Acronym Measurement 
Financial 
Reporting 
Quality 
FRQ Absolute value of standard deviation of firm residuals, from 
years t-6 to t from annual cross-sectional estimations of the 
Francis et al. (2005) model, multiplied by -1 
Corporate 
Governance 
Effectiveness 
CGEFF Score ranging between 0 and 9, with higher score indicates 
more effective corporate governance and zero (0) otherwise. 
Family Control FC Value of one (1) if the major family shareholders own a stake of 
5% or above of firm shares and zero (0) otherwise. 
Firm Size FS The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage LEV The percentage of total debt to total assets. 
Firm 
Performance 
ROA Net profit divided by total assets. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample, Family, And Non-Family Firms 
 
Variables 
Full Sample 
(Firms=68) 
(N=408) 
Family 
(Firms=40) 
(N=240) 
Non-Family 
(Firms=28) 
(N=168) 
Mean Std D Min Max Mean Mean 
FRQ -0.639 0.631 -3.837 -0.011 -0.6780 -0.5840 
CGEFF 3.901 1.645 0.000 9.000 3.7125 4.1726 
FS 7.152 0.607 5.439 8.851 7.0108 7.3560 
LEV 0.540 0.248 0.053 1.082 0.5604 0.5109 
ROA 0.045  0.088 -0.288 0.298 0.0285 0.0691 
FRQ (Financial reporting quality) = Absolute value of standard deviation of firm residuals, from 
years t-6 to t from annual cross-sectional estimations of the Francis et al. (2005) model, multiplied 
by -1. 
CGE (corporate governance effectiveness) = Score ranging between 0 and 9, with higher score 
indicates more effective corporate governance, and zero (0) otherwise. 
FS (Firm Size) = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEV (Leverage) = Percentage of total debt to total assets. 
ROA (Return on Assets) = Percentage of the net profit to total assets. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full and separate 
sample of the family and non-family firms in the Sultanate of Oman. The 
descriptive statistics show a mean value of the financial reporting quality for 
the full sample of -0.639 with a minimum of -3.837 and a maximum of -0.011, 
while the mean value of the financial reporting quality for family and non-
family are -0.6780 and -0.5840, respectively. The results show that the 
financial reporting quality is statistically and significantly different between 
family and non-family firms. This indicates that the quality of financial 
reporting in family firms is lower compared to non-family firms. The 
descriptive statistics also show that the average value of corporate 
governance effectiveness for the full sample is 3.901 with a minimum of zero 
and a maximum of nine, while the mean value for the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance for family firms is 3.7125 and 4.1726 for non-family 
firms. Additionally, the mean value of the firm size for the full sample is 
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7.152 with a minimum of 5.439 and a maximum of 8.851, while the mean 
values for family and non-family firms are 7.0108 and 7.3560, respectively. 
This indicates that the firm size (measured as total assets) in family firms is 
smaller than in non-family firms. Moreover, the average value of leverage 
(the proportion of total debt to total assets) for the full sample is 0.540 with a 
minimum of 0.053 and a maximum of 1.082, while the leverage ratios for 
family and non-family are 0.5604 and 0.5109, respectively. The results show 
that the family firms use more debt than non-family firms. However, the 
descriptive statistics for firm performance (measured as return on assets) for 
the full sample 0.045 with a minimum of -0.288 and a maximum of 0.298, 
while the mean values for the family and non-family sample are 0.0285 and 
0.0691, respectively. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Variables  1 2 3 4 5 
1 FRQ 1.0000     
2 CGEFF 0.1798 1.0000    
3 FS 0.0907 0.2794 1.0000   
4 LEV -0.0599 -0.1790 -0.2344 1.0000  
5 ROA 0.1686 0.2321 0.3489 -0.4590 1.0000 
** and * indicates significant at 1%,  and 5%, respectively (2-tailed).  
Refer to Table 2 for description of variables details. 
 
A Pearson product-moment correlation (r) was computed to examine 
the correlation between the explanatory variables. As shown in Table 3, the 
correlations between explanatory variables are between 0.350 and -0.4590. 
According to Hair et al. (2010), explanatory variables above ±0.7 indicate 
the existence of multicollinearity, which is a serious problem in regression. 
The correlation matrix shows that the correlation among explanatory 
variables is relatively low (below ±0.7) indicating that multicollinearity is 
not a problem. In addition, this study considered other diagnostic tests, such 
as normality and outliers, the results of the skewness and kurtosis for 
normality, as well as the univariate method for outliers, all of which 
confirms that there is no problem in respect of normality and outliers in this 
study. However, with respect to the problems of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, this study performed both tests for which the results confirm 
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the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Hence, the standard 
errors in the financial reporting quality model are estimated based on Rogers 
(1993) clustered at the firm level. Clustering at the firm level produces an 
estimator that is robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-panel 
correlation. This technique ensures that valid statistical inference on the 
coefficient is made.   
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 4: Random Effects Model for Full Sample, Family, and Non-Family Firms 
Variables Full Sample 
(Firms = 68) 
Family 
(Firms= 40) 
Non-family 
(Firms= 28) 
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
CGEFF 0.0603 2.81*** 0.0596 1.88* 0.0649 2.26** 
FS -0.0009 -0.01 0.0235 0.26 -0.0453 -0.48 
LEV 0.0946 0.61 0.0304 0.15 0.1968 0.81 
ROA 1.0980 2.51** 1.2164 2.17** 0.6909 0.94 
Constant -0.9691 -2.12** -1.1160 -1.72* -0.6693 -0.98 
Hausman test 9.12   
Breusch-Pagan 
test 
115.34**   
R
2 
 
0.123 0.156 0.120 
 N 408 240 168 
***, ** and * indicates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Refer to Table 2 for description of variables details. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the result of the Hausman test is > 0.05 (i.e. not 
significant), and for the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test, it is < 0.05 (i.e. 
significant).  These two tests indicate that the random effects model is much 
preferred. Based on the random effects model, the results reveal that the 
corporate governance effectiveness for the full sample is significant (at p-
value < 0.01) in the predicted positive direction, as shown by the estimated 
coefficient. This indicates a strong association between governance 
effectiveness and the financial reporting quality. This result supports that 
companies with a high quality of corporate governance can achieve an extent 
of quality in its financial reporting, due to the reduced agency problems and 
improved monitoring of managerial actions, and, consequently, are likely to 
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provide credible financial reports (Anderson et al., 2004; Ertugrul & Hegde, 
2008; Piot et al., 2007).  
 
To support the results in the full sample regression, this study divided 
the full sample into two groups – family and non-family – to examine 
whether there is any difference in the influence of corporate governance 
effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among family and non-family 
owned companies in the Sultanate of Oman. The result indicates that there is 
a significant positive relationship between the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance and the quality of financial reporting for the family firms (at p-
value < 0.1). This suggests that the relationship between the corporate 
governance effectiveness and the financial reporting quality becomes weak 
when the firms have family ownership. For non-family firms, however, the 
relationship between the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
effectiveness and the financial reporting quality is consistently positive and 
significant (at p-value < 0.05). This result supports prior research arguments 
that family businesses create the mechanisms of corporate governance to 
comply with legal requirements, whereas non-family firms creates provision 
to the primary mechanism to control agency cost, and deal with problems 
relating to the management of the organization and improve the quality of 
financial reporting (Kosnick, 1987). Furthermore, this study supports the 
argument of Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009), who contend that the appointment 
of a board of directors for family firms is to seek expertise and advice 
concerning the strategic direction of the firm rather than to monitor and 
control managerial activities. It is plausible that the role of the board and the 
role of the family have a substitution effect on the financial reporting quality 
that warrants further investigation.  
 
Among the control variables, the relationship between firm size and 
financial reporting quality based on the full, family and non-family samples 
is not significant. Similarly, the effect of leverage on the quality of financial 
reporting for the full sample and the separate samples of family and non-
family is not statistically significant. However, although the effect of 
performance on the full sample and family firms’ sample is positive and 
significant, there is no significant effect for the non-family samples.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this study was to determine whether there is any difference 
in the relationship between corporate governance effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality among the family and non-family owned companies in the 
Sultanate of Oman. This study extended the scope of previous studies 
concerning the quality of financial reporting by considering the business 
environment in the Sultanate of Oman, where the financial markets remain 
less developed and the regulations and corporate control are still weak. In 
addition, firms in the Sultanate of Oman have a more concentrated 
ownership structure in which family ownership control is more common. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing a comparison between 
family and non-family firms in respect of its effect on the corporate 
governance as a composite measure to capture the combined effect of the 
features on the propensity of the quality of financial reporting based on a 
framework conceptualized in accordance with the agency's theory. 
 
The empirical results of this study, based on the panel data for 
companies listed on the Muscat Securities Market from 2013 to 2018, reveal 
that the impact of the effectiveness of the corporate governance on the 
quality of financial reporting is positive and significant for the full and non-
family sample, while this relationship becomes weak for family firms. The 
results of this study are useful to all stakeholders, as it provides them with an 
important indicator regarding the kind of controlling shareholder and the 
internal mechanisms of corporate governance that will protect their interests. 
This study also benefits the regulators and policymakers in the Sultanate of 
Oman, such as the Muscat Securities Market, because this study highlights 
several issues that can assist them in analysing the impact of other corporate 
governance mechanisms on this relationship in the Sultanate of Oman. For 
instance, regulators and policymakers might use the findings regarding the 
quality of financial reporting in the relationship to governance practice, to 
identify the important roles played by internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance as one of the basic mechanisms of the corporate governance 
system in the Sultanate of Oman. 
 
This study has some limitations. First, the quality of the results can 
be judged based on the quality of the sample data. Second, the sample of this 
study only focuses on non-financial companies listed on the Muscat 
Securities Market. Other non-listed companies and financial companies have 
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been disregarded. Therefore, the validation of the conclusions might not hold 
strongly for financial companies and other companies outside these lists. 
Therefore, this study only focuses on the board and audit committee 
characteristics and audit reputation as the main characteristics of corporate 
governance and their association with the quality of corporate governance 
when they work as a substitute or complementary measurement. Following 
the limitations highlighted above, future research could examine the issue of 
the financial reporting quality in different contexts (different economic 
cycles, different stock exchanges or different cultures). In particular, the 
validity of this model can also be examined in the different contexts of the 
GCC countries, in different time periods, and with different sample sizes. 
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